Open hostilities between the British and colonists started early in the morning of April 19, 1775.  A band of cold and tired minutemen stood face to face with the best of the British Army on Lexington Green and were fired upon, thus launching the American colonies into an eight-year struggle that won them their independence from England.  The battle that emerged at Concord that day pitted part-time soldiers on their home turf against the highest quality battlefield troops of the era in disadvantageous terrain.  While the battle proved a victory for the colonials, they could have turned it into a rout if there had been a cohesive command structure.  This battle was a stark contrast to the one that occurred two months later at Bunker Hill, where experienced officers directing militia dealt a stunning blow to the British army.  The difference in these battles will be examined in this paper, especially the command structure that the colonial leaders put in place between them.  Colonial officers, many of whom were veterans of earlier wars, served as not only an inspiration to their troops, but also as motivation to keep fighting.  Officers such as William Prescott, John Stark, Israel Putnam, and Seth Pomeroy, knew that a disorganized rabble could pull out a victory in a running firefight, but a traditional battle required true leadership and tactical planning to ensure victory.  Without these officers, it is unlikely the colonists would have been able to put up an organized defense of Breed’s Hill, much less defeated the British so soundly.   

The origins of the American Revolution can be traced back to the British government’s decision to maintain an army of 8,000 to 10,000 men in the North America at the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763.  This force’s primary purpose was to keep the peace in the wilderness, but when it came into the view of the populace, it aroused the traditional English fear of a tyrannical standing army and gave conspiracy theorists ammunition to arouse the populace.[1]  Also unnerving to the colonists were the taxes that Parliament levied against them to pay for this army.  These taxes sparked mob violence and mass demonstrations but never reached the point of killing someone.[2]  With tensions growing in the colonies after the Boston Tea Party in 1773, Parliament shut down Boston through the Coercive Acts and forced the hand of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.  In response to these acts, which dissolved the General Assembly, Massachusetts formed the Provincial Congress in 1774, an extralegal body that reappointed militia officers once they had resigned their royal appointments and released them from the governor’s authority.[3]  Major General Thomas Gage, the royal governor of Massachusetts and commander-in-chief of British forces in the colonies, found himself in a tight situation in Boston with limited troops and an aroused populace that was preparing for war.  His requests for supply and advice were met with orders from ignorant and unsympathetic royal ministers to actively quell the rebellion.  Gage was trapped in Boston by the people he was supposed to be governing. 

            Part of the problem Gage faced was a populace that had had a military tradition for over 130 years.  The New England militia had initially been organized to protect against Indian raids but adapted as the need arose.  The militia evolved into an organization for propertied men between the ages of 16 and 60 while excluding those who were not white, free, or landed.[4]  While militia were most effective at defending hearth and home, they also won military victories outside New England.  In 1745, New England militia staged a major campaign that resulted in the capture of the French citadel of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island.[5]  During the French and Indian War, the American colonies supplied troops to support the British in their drive to expel the French from North America.  As the fighting became more intense and farther from home, the militia increasingly recruited from the lower levels of society to feed the frontline meat grinder.[6]  These troops generally were of lower fighting quality than the traditional militia; they were less motivated, less adept with weapons, and not as healthy.  While militia officers sometimes earned the respect of the British officers they fought with, these troops only earned their contempt.  It was these troops, not the regular militia, which gave the British a false impression of colonial military preparedness and made them overconfident in the early stages of the War of Independence.[7] 

            When colonial militia were fighting in their own towns and villages, they were an effective force.  Militia did not have the discipline or tactical prowess of the British Army since most of their activities were often limited to parade ground marching.  Their strength did not spring from traditional fighting methods:  many militiamen were hunters, which meant they were marksmen, did not waste shots, and were adept at stalking.  By contrast, the British relied more on their bayonets and strength of numbers, which meant that individual shot accuracy was not stressed.[8]  These shortcomings were made evident at the battles of Concord and Bunker Hill.  While the British army considered Concord a fluke, they were puzzled by the colonists’ ability to stand up to them at Bunker Hill.  How were the colonists able to steadily improve their position and organization in an attempt to stand on a level plane with the British?

            The American Revolution was the first conflict that emotionally involved all segments of the population.  The military historiography has undergone several evolutions, ranging from national aggrandizement to vicious debunking.  As a young nation, America was searching for heroes and early American military history fell victim to hagiography.  Biographers like Reverend William Gordon and Dr. David Ramsay were biased and wrote exaggerated and patriotic accounts that gave Americans impetus for national braggadocio.[9] 

            It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that American historians attempted to clear the fog of national pride and seek more balanced and truthful accounts.  Even so, Whig historians like George Bancroft wrote their works on a nationalistic base until Americans gained access to British at the end of the nineteenth century.  As historians studied these sources, they gained perspective on the conflict and began to structure their writings around a balanced account of events.[10]  These British sources were generally written by officers defending their actions and justifying their mistakes, but are still invaluable to historians studying both sides of the conflict.[11] 

            Scholarship since World War II is often analytical or narrative in style with much more extensive examination of documents reflecting both views of military actions.  Historians will often confine these studies to narratives of battles and strategy without assessing their impact on society.[12]  This paper will attempt to mesh top-down and bottom-up perspectives. 

When the British assault force of 700 men began its march for Concord at two o’clock in the morning on April 19, 1775, they had been standing in the swamp waiting for an hour already.  The colonists knew they were coming, too, and as the advance units approached Lexington, there were seventy minutemen and dozens of spectators waiting on the Green for them.  Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith had been selected by General Gage to command the expedition.   Gage was acting under pressure from Parliament to take some decisive action, and destroying the powder stores at Concord would have crippled the colonists’ abilities to wage war.  Unfortunately for Gage, the colonists knew the British plan and had hid the powder and had alerted every town from Boston to Concord.  When Major John Pitcairn of the Royal Marines reached Lexington with a force of several hundred light infantry, he was facing what appeared to be over a hundred colonists in his path whom he immediately ordered to disarm and disperse.  Captain John Parker, the minuteman commander and a veteran of the French and Indian War, knew he was outnumbered and after he made his point, he ordered his men to disperse.  What followed is a point of contention among scholars.  What is known is that shots were fired on both sides and that 19 casualties resulted, 18 of them colonial and several with wounds in the back.[13] 

            The column marched forward and upon reaching Concord they began to burn and throw into the pond whatever military stores the colonists had left behind.  All throughout the night and into the morning, the alarm had been spreading to nearby towns and villages where minutemen and militia were assembling and marching for Concord.  What ensued was a mess of a fight, but once Colonel Smith suffered casualties and realized he was being surrounded and outnumbered by a rising number of minutemen, he pulled his troops out of Concord.  He had already sent for reinforcements, but would have to traverse six miles between Concord and Lexington to reach them.  During the retreat, colonial militia fired on the British from behind any cover available while the British sent flankers to keep the militia at a respectable distance and burnt houses along the way.  The militia was growing in numbers and strength during the fight while the British were losing men.  Even upon reaching the 1,100 British regulars at Lexington, Smith’s force continued to come under attack from all sides.  In the end, British regulars had fared poorly against inexperienced militia, but were able to survive the encounter because the militia had had no overall strategy.  A coordinated colonial attack may have been able to cut off the British retreat and rout them, but as it was the British suffered 273 casualties to 95 colonials.[14] 

            The news of Concord spread like wildfire.  Within a few days over 16,000 colonial militia had poured into the area around Boston spoiling for a fight.  When no fight appeared, many of them went home.  Those that stayed were recruited by patriot leaders to join the new Grand American Army commanded by General Artemas Ward.  The Massachusetts Provincial Assembly had named him commander-in-chief of all Massachusetts forces and had named John Thomas a lieutenant general and Seth Pomeroy a major general.[15]  They were headquartered at Cambridge, located on the mainland between Boston and Charlestown.  The Provincial Assembly was without its main leaders, John Adams, Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, who were attending the Continental Congress.  In their stead, 34-year old Dr. Joseph Warren was the president of the congress and was later commissioned by them as major general.  He was a physician and an eloquent speaker for the patriot cause. 

            Artemas Ward was a forty seven-year old farmer who had served in the French and Indian War twenty years before, but like his fellow officers had never commanded an army.  His command of the army has been described by historians as timid, but with the urging of the Provincial Assembly and his advisors he was often able to overcome his caution.[16]  To his credit, he had been ill with bladder stones when a messenger had awakened him in the middle of the night after the Battle of Concord to take command of the army.[17]  Fifty-year old Dr. John Thomas was also a veteran of the French and Indian War and King George’s War.  Seth Pomeroy of Northampton, Massachusetts was a member of the Provincial Congress.  He had served with distinction in the siege of Louisbourg in 1745 and again at the Battle of Lake George in 1755 in the French and Indian War.  He was a well-respected gunsmith and blacksmith in Northampton as well as a community leader.  He was a crack shot and was extremely cool under pressure.  What makes his service so surprising is that he was 69 years old in 1775.[18] 

            Militia appeared from other colonies as well.  The news of Concord reached Israel Putnam while he was ploughing in his field in Connecticut.  He immediately unhitched his plough team and true to his impetuous nature, the 57-year old rode straight for Boston, arriving a day later.[19]  He soon returned to Hartford for a week to raise troops and to accept his commission as brigadier general and third in command of the Connecticut militia.[20]  Putnam was a legend in New England.  “Old Put” had served with distinction in the French and Indian War and had made a reputation for narrowly escaping avoidable traps.  As a field commander and as an inspiration for his troops, he was second to none, but he was notably lacking in his strategic thinking.  His troops were stationed outside of Cambridge in a position to counter any British landing from Boston.  Among his troops were officers who had served with him in the previous war, including Captain Thomas Knowlton and Captain Durkee.[21]  The commander of the New Hampshire troops was 46-year old Colonel John Stark, a frontiersman who served as an officer in Major Robert Roger’s Rangers in the French and Indian War.[22]  Stark’s regiment was stationed at Medford, across the Mystic River from Cambridge while Colonel James Reed’s New Hampshire regiment was stationed at the Charlestown Neck.[23]  The colonial forces had surrounded Boston and were waiting for action. 

            The weeks that followed the Battle of Concord were filled with activity.  Joseph Warren worked with the Massachusetts Committee of Safety to organize the army.  Militia units had to be absorbed into the new Grand American Army, officerial appointments had to be made, and the men had to be kept busy.  Because of pervasive localism and bickering, army commanders allowed entire minuteman units to enlist under their old commanders, commanders who were usually elected by their men.  In addition, a lack of experienced officers caused army leaders to promote many junior officers.  One example was Captain John Nixon, commander of the second Minute Company of Framingham who was promoted to Colonel.  He raised a new regiment of 590 men within a week and his unit saw action at Bunker Hill.[24]

There was some excitement on the night of May 13 when General Putnam led 2,200 of his troops onto Charlestown peninsula marching to the tune of fifes and drums.  According to British Lieutenant Barker:

The rebels came from Cambridge, marched over the Neck at Charlestown and up the heights above the town, where they kept parading a long time, then marched into the town and after giving a war-hoop opposite the Somerset, returned as they came.[25]

No shots were fired during this display, which Putnam informed his officers was to instill confidence in the men.[26]  Only an impetuous and experienced officer would dare taunt the British like that. 

            Other activity followed in the form of cattle and hay raids on the nearby settlements.  These were generally minor skirmishes involving no more than 100 men, but they kept the troops on their toes.  On May 26 in the midst of these engagements, several British warships arrived bearing reinforcements in the form of 1,500 troops and three officers, Major Generals William Howe, Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne, who were sent to motivate Gage to act.[27]  These troops added to the 3,500 in Boston already and the ships further strengthened the British naval presence in Boston Harbor.  The fleet was under the command of Admiral Thomas Graves. 

Boston is located on a peninsula that connects southward to the mainland by a narrow stretch of land called the Roxbury Neck.  General Thomas Gage fortified this neck in December 1774 in anticipation of hostilities and the militia followed suit in May of 1775 to prevent a British march from Boston.  To the east of Roxbury is Dorchester, and more importantly, the Dorchester Heights that overlook Boston.  Burgoyne boasted he would “soon find elbow room” for the besieged army[28] and this area was lightly fortified by the militia, presenting an inviting target for the newly arrived “triumvirate of reputation,” as Burgoyne called Howe, Clinton, and himself.  The British plan was to land troops at Dorchester to take control of the heights and prevent them from being fortified.  They would then march west to Roxbury, flanking General Thomas’s position and forcing him to withdraw and clearing the land route out of Boston.  This attack was to take place on June 18^th but was discovered by colonial spies several days in advance.[29]

The colonial plan to counter this strategy was vital to maintaining the siege.  After much discussion, General Ward and Dr. Warren reluctantly gave the order to fortify Bunker Hill on the Charlestown peninsula.  General Putnam was to have supervisory control of the expedition and Colonel William Prescott was to take direct command of a force of 1,260 men and lead them to Bunker Hill to build fortifications and to hold the peninsula until relieved.  This command included Prescott’s regiment as well as those of Colonels Frye and Bridge, a company of artillery under Major Scarborough Gridley, and two hundred Connecticut troops under Captain Knowlton.  On the evening of June 16, Prescott’s troops gathered on Cambridge Common to hear a blessing then marched across the Charlestown Neck in the darkness to Bunker Hill.  Colonel Richard Gridley, the chief engineer, accompanied them.[30] 

Forty nine-year old Colonel William Prescott had been commander of a minute regiment that marched to Lexington on April 19 but saw no action.  He had seen action as a rifleman in the siege of Louisbourg and as an officer in the French and Indian War.  He declined a regular commission to return to his estate in Pepperell, Massachusetts.[31]  He was a foil for Putnam on Bunker Hill.  He was a cool-headed and professional soldier adept at strategy and tactics while Putnam was impetuous and hard charging with little grasp of combat strategy.  Upon reaching Bunker Hill, Putnam and Prescott got into a debate about whether to fortify Bunker or Breed’s Hill.[32]  Gridley cut them off by telling them there would not be enough time to fortify either if they did not start right away.  Ultimately Putnam won and Prescott's men began work on Breed’s Hill at midnight according to Gridley’s plans.[33] 

The geography of the Charlestown peninsula prompted the shift to Breed’s Hill.  Charlestown is connected to the mainland by a narrow neck of land 130 yards wide that is often under water at high tide and British warships could bring their guns to bear on this passage.  The peninsula is 2,000 yards long from east to west and is 1,200 yards across from north to south.  Its northern and southern borders are the Mystic and Charles Rivers, respectively.  A narrow channel separates it from Boston to the east.  Bunker Hill starts at the Neck and rises sharply to a height of 113 feet and gently slopes down to the east and forms a low ridge along the Mystic River’s shore parallel to Breed’s Hill.  Breed’s Hill starts near the southern end of Bunker Hill and extends toward the south and east.  The summits of Breed’s, which is 87 feet high, and Bunker Hills are separated by 700 yards.  The ground to the north and east of Breed’s Hill is marshy.  At the northeastern extremity of the peninsula is Morton’s Point, which rises to a height of 35 feet.  The village of Charlestown lay to the south of Breed’s Hill and in plain sight of Boston.[34]   Putnam wanted to fortify Breed’s Hill ostensibly because it was closer to Boston.[35]

The men worked through the night and at four o’clock in the morning, with the sun rising over the misty harbor, a British sentry aboard the HMS Lively spotted the raised earthworks on the peak of Breed’s Hill and sounded the alarm.  The Lively’s crew began firing on the redoubt, but were soon ordered to stop by a freshly awakened Admiral Graves.[36]  The colonists had managed to put their skills at clearing fields to work in constructing a redoubt roughly 40 yards square.  When General Gage ordered the fleet and the battery atop Copp’s Hill to continue firing, it spooked the colonists on Breed’s Hill.  Most of these men had never seen combat before and some began to desert.  When a cannonball hit Private Asa Pollard, a member of Colonel Bridge’s regiment who was working on the breastwork, some of the men wanted to stop work to hold a funeral service[37], but Prescott refused.  Prescott did his share of digging, as well, and when the soldier was killed, he jumped up to the top of the redoubt in an attempt to show his troops that fear was only in their heads.  He walked the perimeter of the redoubt shouting instructions and encouragement to his men.  He was in no real danger, anyway, because the British guns could not elevate enough to hit the top of the hill.  Soon other officers followed suit and climbed the breastwork to motivate their men, who soon became indifferent to the shelling.[38]  Besides Pollard, the other casualty of the bombardment were two hogsheads of water, the only water provision the colonists had brought with them.  They had to rely on the wells in Charlestown for the rest of the day.[39] What was perhaps Prescott’s greatest concern was the number of men who had not brought food with them as ordered.  He sent a messenger to General Ward to ask for provisions but was rebuffed.  The men became weary from digging all night, but Prescott wrote in his memoirs, “Never were men in worse condition for action, exhausted by watching, fatigue and hunger, and never did old soldiers behave better.” [40]  Prescott was as professional a soldier as the colonists had and was hard pressed to keep his men in the redoubt working even still.[41] 

While this shelling was going on, the British senior officers met and decided on a battle plan.  Generals Howe, Gage, Clinton, and Burgoyne discussed various proposals.  Gage vetoed Clinton’s proposal to send a force behind the redoubt and cut it off on the grounds that it was against traditional military wisdom to land a force between two opposing forces.  General Howe’s plan to land troops at Morton’s Point and launch a frontal attack with a flanking maneuver was accepted by the council and they began preparations for the assault.  However, it would not be possible to land troops there for another six hours because the tide was out.[42] 

This respite gave Prescott plenty of time to shore up his defenses.  His men built a breastwork that extended from the redoubt down to the Mystic side of the hill to protect his flank.  On Bunker Hill to the rear, Israel Putnam was busy giving orders and trying to strengthen his position.  He twice rode across the cannon swept Charlestown Neck to ask General Ward for reinforcements and was rebuffed twice.  Ward finally relented at the urging of the Committee of Safety and ordered Colonel Stark to send two regiments to reinforce Prescott.  When Stark received these orders, he immediately started out with his regiment and Colonel Reed’s.  Stark was firmly in command of these 1,200 frontiersmen, men with excellent aim but limited ammunition.  The lack of ammunition among the colonists was to be a theme throughout the day.  When Stark’s column reached the British bombardment on Charlestown Neck, Stark kept his marching pace, prompting the commander of the lead company to question him.  Stark responded simply, “one fresh man in action is worth ten fatigued men.” [43]  These fresh soldiers were to prove instrumental later in the day.  Upon reaching Bunker Hill, Stark surveyed the battlefront and deployed his troops to the colonial left flank, where Prescott had just deployed Captain Knowlton and his 200 men.  Knowlton directed his men to use the stones from an old rail fence to create a barrier and to fill in the gaps with grass and hay to give it the appearance of solidity.  Stark’s men built a stone rail fence that was parallel to the front of Bunker Hill and perpendicular to Knowlton’s position along the flank of Breed’s Hill. 

The colonials received a few more surprises when Major Generals Joseph Warren in his Sunday best[44] and Seth Pomeroy with his 1745 Louisbourg musket[45] arrived.  Prescott offered both of them general command, but both declined.  Pomeroy declined due to age and because he had ridden all night from Northampton to reach the battle on time.[46]  Warren declined because he was sure Prescott was in command.  Both men served as an inspiration to the soldiers on the line and Pomeroy was especially helpful in directing fusillades that proved devastating to the British, including the one that killed Major Pitcairn of Lexington fame.[47]

            Prescott had deployed Knowlton at one o’clock because Howe’s force was landing on Morton’s Point.  Inexplicably, once his troops had landed and formed into units, Howe had them break for lunch, giving the colonists that much longer to complete their preparations.  The overconfident General Howe underestimated the strategic minds of the colonial commanders.  General Howe had other problems to contend with, though.  His 6-pound artillery pieces were equipped with 12-pound balls and his men had to march over and around fences to reach the battlefront.  Howe also made two costly tactical mistakes.  First, he did not give the order for his troops to remove their heavy packs, which slowed them down, and more specifically nullified the advantage of light infantry.[48]  Second, General Howe ignored his mentor’s maxim about assaulting a fortified position and ordered an assault in lines; General Wolfe had stated that a fortified position should be attacked in columns with sharpshooters in between to distract the defenders.  This decision gave the defenders a wide target to shoot at and the heavy packs they carried limited their speed.  They were sitting ducks for the entrenched colonists.[49]

            General Howe’s attack was organized into two parts:  Howe would command the light infantry on the British right flank against the rail fence and his second in command, Brigadier General Robert Pigot would assault the breastworks and the redoubt.  Howe had drawn the plan up before Stark and Knowlton had fortified the left flank, so Howe was facing a much stronger and entrenched enemy.  The colonials, who knew they were short on ammunition, were ordered by their officers to hold their fire as the British advanced.  The effective range of a musket was no more than 60 yards, so the three major commanders, Stark at the rail fence, Putnam at the breastwork, and Prescott in the redoubt, made tactically crucial decisions.  They ordered their men to wait until the enemy was upon them to open fire.  This greatly increased the efficiency of the limited ammunition and proved devastating to the British attack.  The colonists in the same fashion repulsed a second assault.  According to a British officer observing the battle from Boston, the British “troops behaved with the most unexampled bravery.”[50] This is fortunate for the British, indeed, because the American defenders were firing “a solid line of flame” into the advancing British lines.[51]

            By the third wave, Howe had wizened up.  He ordered his men to drop their packs and to attack in columns for a bayonet charge.  While the British still suffered heavy casualties during this phase, they were able to breach the colonial defenses and force a retreat.  Colonel Prescott held off many of the British with his sword while telling his sans-bayonet musketmen to swing their guns as clubs.[52]  Even so, with Dr. Warren and Prescott trying to maintain order, the British inflicted their heaviest damage during this part of the fight.  Colonel Stark was able to protect the retreat from his side for several minutes, but he, too, had to retreat due to lack of ammunition.  While the British attacked from the left and right flanks, the colonials managed to escape down the center and keep the British from catching each other in the crossfire.  The colonials tried to hold a defense on Bunker Hill, but were not deeply entrenched enough to withstand an attack, and they also lacked ammunition, so Putnam led his men off the peninsula and onto the mainland.  General Clinton, who had joined the attack for the third assault, tried to bring the regulars back into formation to continue the pursuit, but to no avail.[53]  By the time the British were ready to march, the colonials were dug in on the mainland.  The British ended the day with fifty percent casualties and control of the peninsula while the colonials suffered much less.[54]  The colonials lost 140 killed and 271 wounded with most of these coming during the retreat[55]; the British suffered 226 dead and 828 wounded.[56]  The British had suffered greatly indeed, according to one observer, “as we have lost some of the best officers in the service.”  He also states, “Nor do I see that we enjoy one solid benefit in return, or likely to reap from it any advantage whatever.”[57]  The British had the peninsula, but at what cost?

            The British had great respect for the colonials after the battle.  The observer states the British learned from the battle “that the Americans, if they were equally well commanded, are as full as good soldiers as ours…and are very little inferior to us even in discipline and steadiness of countenance.”[58]  The British, especially General Howe, would not underestimate the colonists again. 

            As for the futures of the colonial commanders, William Prescott continued to serve and joined the Continental Army upon its creation.  He fought in the campaigns around New York in 1776 and in Saratoga in 1777, but retired soon after due to injury.  He continued to be active in civic affairs and even served three years in the Massachusetts legislature. He died at his home in 1795.  [59]  Seth Pomeroy returned to Northampton soon after the battle.  There he received his commission as the first brigadier general in the Continental Army, but after 28 days of inaction, the Continental Congress reassigned the commission to his comrade, John Thomas.  Pomeroy continued to be active in the affairs of western Massachusetts and was an effective recruiter and regimental commander until called back into service in January 1777.  While leading a force of Massachusetts militia to join the Continental Army in New Jersey, his age finally caught up to him.  He died at age seventy in Peekskill, New York, in February.[60]  Israel Putnam was promoted to major general in the Continental Army following the battle, but his record as a combat officer in the following years was unimpressive and led to a court of inquiry in October 1777.  Even though he was acquitted, he never took another combat role and returned to Connecticut to serve as a recruiter among other posts.  He did this until he suffered a paralytic stroke in December 1779.  He died in Connecticut in 1790 with his reputation for combat bravery intact.[61]  John Stark returned to New Hampshire after the battle, but did not remain inert for long.  New Hampshire appointed him brigadier general in 1776 and he fought off and on during the rest of the war, making his mark at the Battle of Bennington.  He died in 1822.[62]  The Continental Congress commissioned Artemas Ward as the first major general of the Continental Army, a post in which he served until 1777.  He remained active in politics until 1795 and died at his home in 1800. 

            The Battle of Concord was significant because it was the first true instance of armed conflict between the British and the colonists, but the lack of organization and unified command among the colonists made it a running firefight and a fluke during the war.  The Battle of Bunker Hill is even more significant because it marked the first instance of an organized opposition to the British, strategic maneuvering, and tactical preparedness among the colonists.  While much research has been done to understand the origins of the War of Independence, less has been done to understand the actions colonial leaders took to improve their army. 

            The major difference in the battles of Concord and Bunker Hill was the ability of the colonists to fight the British on their own terms, something that would not have been possible without quality leadership.  Colonial commanders were able to keep their men on the line and under control while facing the best troops in the world.  This significant feat influenced the rest of the war because it gave colonists the confidence to continue to stand up the British.  The realization that they had won a victory had these fortunate and some unfortunate consequences for the colonists.  For one, the “indestructible myth of the invincible minuteman was born,”[63] giving colonists the impression that all they had to do was grab their muskets and they could give better than they would receive, a costly overconfidence.  In addition, the junior officers of these units were often popularly elected, rendering them impotent to the whim of the electorate.[64]  Only when these officers were answerable to a higher authority would they become effective.   

Also, if the Battle of Bunker Hill had gone poorly for the colonists it may have effectively ended colonial resistance. 

             The colonial commanders at Bunker Hill were the defining force in the battle.  A disorganized bunch would have wasted their ammunition and lost many men in a retreat.  The Battle of Bunker Hill was tactically a British victory, for they forced the colonists off the Charlestown peninsula.  However, the battle was a strategic victory for the colonists because they were able to face down an enemy force superior in numbers, ammunition, and discipline in a way they could not at Concord.  At Concord, a disorganized rabble was defending hearth and home, but Bunker Hill gave the British their first taste of an entrenched and well-led American force.  The colonial leaders were decisive and staunch in the face of factionalism and the best army in the world.  That the colonists had the stomach to fire on the British is a feat in itself, but the way in which they decimated not only the cream of the British army, but also its officers, proved the value of marksmanship and leadership among the colonials.